Tarski gave a general semantics for deductive reasoning: a formula a may be deduced from a set A of formulas i a holds in all models in which each of the elements of A holds. A more liberal semantics has been considered: a formula a may be deduced from a set A of formulas i a holds in all of the preferred models in which all the elements of A hold. Shoham proposed that the notion of preferred models be de ned by a partial ordering on the models of the underlying language. A more general semantics is described in this paper, based on a set of natural properties of choice functions. This semantics is here shown to be equivalent to a semantics based on comparing the relative importance of sets of models, by what amounts to a qualitative probability measure. The consequence operations de ned by the equivalent semantics are then characterized by a weakening of Tarski's properties in which the monotonicity requirement is replaced by three weaker conditions. Classical propositional connectives are characterized by natural introduction-elimination rules in a nonmonotonic setting. Even in the nonmonotonic setting, one obtains classical propositional logic, thus showing that monotonicity is not required to justify classical propositional connectives.
Introduction
This paper is intended for logicians. It builds on the insights, motivations and techniques developed by researchers in Knowledge Representation and Arti cial Intelligence, but its purpose is to present the topic of (AI-type) nonmonotonic deduction (or induction) to logicians. It is not claimed that the results of this paper will prove useful to AI practice. It uses the language of Mathematics (theorems and proofs) to study a form of deduction that is more general than the one used in Mathematics. A logician interested only in the (monotonic) kind of deduction used in Mathematics should not read further.
A semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning, more general than Shoham's [37] , will be presented. This semantics is closely related to, but generalizes, concepts developed by the Social Choice community. In this semantic framework one may de ne the family of preferential operations of [19] in a way that does not assume a pre-existing monotonic logic or connectives. Connectives may then be de ned and studied by introduction-elimination rules as is done in monotonic logics.
Monotonic Logics
In the thirties, Tarski made a number of fundamental advances in the study of mathematical logic: he proposed a semantics for logical deduction (see in particular [40, p. 127] ): a formula a follows from a set A of formulas i a holds in all models in which all the elements of A hold. These ideas were rst expounded in [39, 38] (English translation in [41] , Chapters 3 and 5 respectively). He characterized the consequence operations that may be de ned by such a semantics as those operations that satisfy Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity, as in Theorem 1. That theorem, however, does not seem to appear in Tarski's work, since he deals from the start only with compact operations. After having settled the question of what is deduction, or what is a logic, without being tied to any speci c logical calculus, he was able to deal with the meaning of connectives, one at a time. This section contains a sketch of some results concerning monotonic deductive operations, that we are interested in generalizing to nonmonotonic operations.
Let us assume a non-empty set (language) L and a function C : 2 L ! 2 L are given. Nothing is assumed about the language. Assume M is a set (of models), about which no assumption is made, and j= M L is a (satisfaction) binary relation. For any set A L, we shall denote by b A or by Mod(A) the set of all models that satisfy all elements of A: b A = Mod(A) = fx 2 M j x j= a; 8a 2 Ag:
For typographical reasons we shall use both notations, sometimes even in the same formula. For any set of models X M, we shall denote by X the set of all formulas that are satis ed in all elements of X: X = fa 2 L j x j= a; 8x 2 Xg:
The following are easily proven, for any A; B L, X; Y M: they amount to the fact that the operations X 7 ! X and A 7 ! b
A form a Galois connection.
A ; X = c X Theorem 1 There exists a set M (of models) and a satisfaction relation j= M L such that C(A) = b A i C satis es the following three conditions:
Inclusion A C(A);
Idempotence C(C(A)) = C(A);
Monotonicity A B ) C(A) C(B):
Proof : The only if part is very easy to prove, using the Galois connection properties of the transformations X 7 ! X and A 7 ! b A. The if part takes M to be the set of all theories, the set of all sets T L such that T = C(T ). De ne, then, T j= a i a 2 T . By the de nition of j=, X = \ T 2X T and b
A is the set of theories T that include A. b A is therefore the intersection of all theories that include A. Since, by Idempotence, C(A) is a theory, and since it includes A by Inclusion, b A C(A). By Monotonicity C(A) C(T ) = T for any theory T that includes A, and therefore C(A) is a subset of the intersection of all such theories T , i.e., C(A) b A.
As customary in the literature, C(A; B) will denote C (A [ B) , C(a) denotes C(fag) and C(A; a) denotes C(A [ fag). A number of important results about the operations that satisfy Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity have been proven. Let us mention three of them, in order to consider their generalization to nonmonotonic operations. The rst one is that an intersection of theories is a theory. If, for any i 2 I, A i = C(A i ), then
The second one is that given a family C i , i 2 I, of operations that satisfy Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity, their intersection, de ned by, ( T i2I C)(A) def = T i2I (C(A)) also satis es Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity. Another result, worth noticing, is that, if C satis es Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity, and if B L, then the operation C 0 de ned by C 0 (A) = C(A; B), i.e., the operation that follows from the acceptance of B once and for all satis es Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity. A last, for us, important result of Tarski that will be generalized in Section 8.2 is that the propositional connectives may be characterized elegantly and one at a time by Introduction-Elimination rules.
Plan of this work
This paper proposes a new family of operations, introduced in Section 4. This family is de ned by ve properties, two of them introduced here for the rst time. These properties replace Tarski's condition of Monotonicity by three weaker properties. The main purpose of this paper is to show the importance of this family, and why it crops up naturally in di erent contexts.
To this e ect, we, rst, in Section 5, describe two very di erent semantics, or ontologies, for nonmonotonic reasoning. The equivalence of these semantics is proved, under a simplifying assumption. This equivalence lends weight to the claim that both semantics are natural and important. The rst one is based on choice functions, enjoying properties that have been studied by researchers in Social Choice (Social Preferences, Rational Choice or Revealed Preference Theory may have been names more to the point) [5, 3, 36, 2] already almost half a century ago. The link between their preoccupations and ours certainly needs further study. The second one is based on a qualitative notion of a measure. Its origins may be traced to Ben-David and Ben-Eliyahu's [4] . The formalism of Friedman and Halpern's [14, 15] is the one used here.
Then, in Section 6, the simplifying logical assumption is removed and the properties we expect of choice functions in the more general framework are discussed. One of the central ideas necessary to deal with the general case de nability preservation has been put in evidence by Schlechta's [31] . The semantics proposed are a natural generalization of Tarski's semantics. The interest and importance of the family of operations described in Section 4 are put in evidence in Section 7, where it is shown that they characterize exactly the operations de ned by the semantics of Section 6. In Section 8 we discuss further properties of the operations of the family de ned in Section 4 and, in particular, the characterization of propositional connectives by Introduction-Elimination rules. It is shown that the logics of the (semantically) classical connectives is classical propositional calculus. In Section 9 it is shown that, if the language L is a propositional calculus, the nitary consequence relations de ned by our family of operations are exactly the preferential consequence relations of [19] . In Section 10 a more restricted family of operations, de ned by equivalent semantic restrictions concerning choice functions on one hand and qualitative measures on the other hand, is characterized by an additional requirement on the nonmonotonic operations. Properties of this family are brie y discussed. Section 11 is a conclusion.
Nonmonotonic Deduction Operations
In this section we shall present ve properties of an operation C : 2 L ! 2 L , discuss them and their relation to properties of monotonic operations. We shall argue that they should be satis ed by inference operations. In the next sections, we shall de ne suitable semantics for them and prove a representation theorem.
Our rst two properties are uncontroversial, at least for mathematical logicians. They may not be satis ed by most deductive agents with bounded resources, though. Inclusion and Idempotence are two of the conditions characterizing monotonic deduction and seem most natural also in the context of nonmonotonic deduction.
Inclusion 8A L A C(A);
Idempotence 8A L C(C(A)) = C(A):
The rst one, Inclusion, requires that all assumptions be part of the conclusions. The second one, Idempotence, expresses the requirement that the strength or the validity of a conclusion be una ected by the length of the chain of arguments leading to its acceptance. We require the operation C squeeze the fruit, i.e., the assumptions to the end, i.e., until no more conclusions can be obtained.
The next three properties are properties of restricted monotonicity. They are implied by Monotonicity, and express that, in certain situations, Monotonicity is required.
Cautious Monotonicity is a restricted form of Monotonicity: any monotonic operation is cautiously monotonic. This property was rst introduced by D. Gabbay [16] , in its nitary form and by D. Makinson [24, 25] in its in nitary form. It requires that one does not retract previous conclusions when one learns that a previous conclusion is indeed true. It seems to have been accepted as reasonable by all researchers in the eld. A discussion of its appeal may be found in [19] .
The next two properties are described here for the rst time, but they are closely related to the property previously discussed under the name of Deductivity or In nite Conditionalization in [11, 12, 9, 13, 25, 18] . The rst one, termed Conditional Monotonicity, expresses the requirement that C behave monotonically if one replaces, in the assumptions, some of the assumptions by their consequences. It asserts that non-monotonicity cannot be caused by the deduction process itself. It is only the addition of new assumptions unrelated to the old ones or assumptions that are less than the full sets of conclusions that can lead to non-monotonicity.
Conditional Monotonicity
This is indeed a monotonicity requirement, if C satis es Inclusion, since
But this is a very restricted form of Monotonicity: we do not allow adding arbitrary, unrelated, assumptions, only replacing part of the assumptions by their consequences. When doing so, we do require that one does not lose conclusions, but one may add conclusions. It is worth noticing that Conditional Monotonicity is an intrinsically in nitary condition: even if A and B are nite, C(A) that appears on the right hand side is typically in nite. If C is a Tarski deductive operation, i.e., satis es Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity, then,
and we have: C(A; B) = C(C(A); B). In the system presented here, C(A; B) may be a strict subset of C(C(A); B). Conditional Monotonicity seems related with Cautious Monotonicity, but it is not. In Cautious Monotonicity, we allow the addition of a subset of C(A), whereas Conditional Monotonicity requires the addition of C(A) in its entirety. In Conditional Monotonicity, the addition may be done in the presence of some other assumptions (B), whereas in Cautious Monotonicity B must be empty. The intuitive justi cation for Conditional Monotonicity will be given now, it explains the term Conditional Monotonicity: if c 2 C(A; B), then, in C(A), there should be something (some conditional statements) to the e ect that: if B then c. But, together with B, this should imply c and therefore c should be in C(C(A); B). Our last property, termed Threshold Monotonicity, requires that C behave monotonically in all cases in which the deduction process has already been applied to part of the assumptions, i.e., above the threshold of some C(A). If C(A) is part of the assumptions, then C behaves monotonically.
Threshold Monotonicity C(A) B C ) C(B) C(C)
The intuitive reason for this requirement is similar to the one for Conditional Monotonicity. We expect that, if C(A) B and c 2 C(B), formulas saying that: if B then c, are already in C(A). The set C, then, contains both if B then c and B, therefore C(C) should contain c.
Before we move to our main representation result, let us draw one important consequence of the properties above.
Two semantics in a simpli ed framework
We shall now describe two natural di erent semantics for nonmonotonic operations: one based on choice functions and one based on qualitative probability measures. We shall show their equivalence, under simplifying assumptions to be described now. The exact t between the semantics based on choice functions and the formal properties of nonmonotonic deduction operations described in Section 4 will be proved in Section 7.
A simplifying assumption
The general setting, assuming an arbitrary language L, will be developed in Section 6. It requires that sets of models that may be de ned by a set of formulas be given prominence.
De nition 1 A set X of models is said to be de nable i one of the two following equivalent conditions holds:
The set of all de nable subsets of X will be denoted by D X .
A set of models is de nable i it is the set of all models satisfying some set of formulas. In many situations in which a niteness assumption is reasonable, one may avoid the consideration of the special role of de nable sets. For example, researchers in Social Choice typically assume the set of outcomes is nite. Friedman and Halpern, also, assume, at least in part of their work, that the base set is nite. For expository purposes, to keep de nitions and justi cations simple, we shall now make a similar assumption, to be lifted in Section 6. We shall assume that every set of models is de nable.
Simplifying Assumption 8X M; X = c X Any propositional calculus on a nite number of atomic propositions satis es our Simplifying Assumption.
Choice functions
The properties described in this section have been put in evidence for the rst time, probably, by researchers in social choice, triggered by H. Cherno [5] , H. Uzawa [42] and K. Arrow [3] (for an updated survey, see [27] ). The exact nature of the link between nonmonotonic logics and the theory of choice functions needs further research. For the sake of those readers who are not familiar with this literature, let us describe brie y its framework: each individual has personal preferences over a set of possible outcomes. The society, given a subset of those, the feasible outcomes, must come up with a the subset of those feasible outcomes that are acceptable socially, in view of the individual preferences. Di erent methods of social decision result in di erent functions from sets of feasible outcomes to sets of acceptable outcomes. Social Choice investigates the relations between those di erent methods for social decision and the choice functions they determine. Independently, Y. Shoham, in [37] , proposed a general semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning, based on preferences among models. The link between the properties of choice functions studied by Social Choice researchers and Nonmonotonic Reasoning has been put in evidence by Doyle and Wellman [7] , Rott [30] and Lindstr om [23] . Lindstr om generalizes the nitary framework considered in Revealed Preference Theory to an in nitary framework. In [31, 32] , Karl Schlechta rediscovered choice functions and their properties, in the in nitary framework. He also considered an additional property needed in such a framework. Schlechta's line of research is best described in [34] and [35] . The only novelty of this section is the detailed argumentation justifying the assumptions about the choice function.
The basic idea is that one can generalize Tarski's semantic analysis of deduction by considering, instead of all models of a set A of formulas, only a subset of this set: the set of best models of A, jumping, on the basis of A, to the conclusion that the situation at hand is one of those best situations. Such a manner of drawing conclusions from categorical information has been time and again attested by researchers in cognitive sciences. Lako 's [20] is a good introduction. The author's [21] represents a very tentative formalization.
We consider a set M of models, a satisfaction relation j= and a choice function f : 2 M ! 2 M that chooses, for a set X of models, the set of best, most typical, most important, or preferred models for the set X. Then we de ne the function C by
The use of a choice function to de ne a (nonmonotonic) consequence operation generalizes Shoham's semantics and represents one step up in the abstraction ladder from Shoham's semantics. Shoham assumed that the choice function f is de ned in a particular way: f (X) is the set of all elements of X that are minimal in X, under some, pre-existing, order relation on M. We prefer to deal directly with properties of the function f , without assuming any order relation on M.
Let us now present natural conditions on f . The monotonic case corresponds to the case that the function f is required to be the identity function. The conditions below are trivially satis ed by the identity function.
Let us take the following running example, that will exemplify the fact that the properties of the choice function f de ne, in a sense the logic of optimization. You are looking for an apartment in Paris. The set of apartments on the market in Paris is the set M. Your real estate agent asks for your desiderata and your nancial possibilities. You expect her to come up with a limited list of the best apartments available in Paris. You expect a list that is neither too small nor too large. Notice that this example does not t exactly the Social Choice paradigm, interested in nding a subset of outcomes that are acceptable in the view of contradictory preferences of the individuals, since we assumed you alone are looking for an apartment. But it may be tted to the Social Choice paradigm if you consider that you are shopping for an apartment that ts in some way the contradictory desiderata of a family, and of the real estate agent.
The rst property we expect of f is a property of contraction.
Contraction f (X) X
Indeed, intuitively, f picks the preferred models of the set X and those models are in the set X. The identity function satis es Contraction. Contraction is assumed in the Social Choice literature without even mentioning it explicitly. If you requested an apartment in Paris, you expect to get a list of apartments in Paris, not in Neuilly or in San Francisco.
The second property expresses the fact that, if X is a subset of Y , it is more di cult to be one of the best of the bigger set Y than to be one of the best of the smaller set X. Therefore we expect any element of f (Y ) that happens to be in X to be in f (X).
This is Sen's [36] property . The identity function satis es Coherence. Coherence is a kind of antimonotonicity: if X Y , then antimonotonicity would require: f (Y ) f (X), whereas Coherence only requires that this part of f (Y ) that is included in X is included in f (X). The term Coherence seems to be an appropriate name since it expresses the existence of some kind of coherent test by which the preferred elements of a set are picked up: the test corresponding to a superset must be at least as demanding as the one of a subset. The Coherence property appears in Cherno 's [5] and has been given his name in [27] . It has been endorsed by all researchers in Social Choice.
To illustrate Coherence, suppose you now remember you promised your wife you would live on the left bank, but forgot to tell that to your agent. You tell her that and get a new list, of apartments on the left bank. You expect all the left bank apartments that appeared in the rst list to be included in the second list. The second list will probably also include other apartments, that were not part of the, say twenty, best apartments in Paris, but are part the best apartments on the left bank.
The third and last property expresses the fact that, if Y is a subset of X, but large enough to include all of f (X), then we do not expect f (Y ) to be larger than f (X).
The term Local Monotonicity expresses that this is a property of quali ed monotonicity for f :
, conditional on f (X) Y , somehow a local condition. The importance of property has been put in evidence by M. A. Aizerman [2, 1] . The identity function satis es Local Monotonicity, because it is monotonic, but also trivially, because the assumption implies X = Y .
Suppose all best apartments of Paris included in the list you got from your agent happen to be on the left bank. You certainly would not expect a larger list if you told her you want only apartments on the left bank.
Any choice function satisfying Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity is considered acceptable in this work. A number of other properties of choice functions, from the literature, will be discussed now. Researchers in Social Choice have universally endorsed the following: f (X) is not empty if X is not empty. Some have noticed that this property is not crucial and that they could build the theory without it. We have no reason to make this requirement: it may well be the case that our search for a large cheap apartment in Paris in the best quarter leaves us with an empty list.
Another property that has been widely considered is:
It does not follow from Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity. We do not endorse it. An apartment, on the Ile de la Cit e, that makes the list of the ten best apartments on the left bank and (or) the Ile de la Cit e and also makes the list of the ten best apartments on the right bank and (or) the Ile de la Cit e, does not necessarily makes the list of the ten best apartments in Paris. One easily sees that the semantics proposed by Shoham in [37] validates Contraction, Coherence, Local Monotonicity and also Expansion: if z is minimal in X and minimal in Y it is minimal in the union X [ Y . Therefore, the semantics proposed in this paper is a strict generalization of Shoham's. In fact, under our simplifying assumption, Shoham's semantics is equivalent to considering choice functions that satisfy Contraction, Coherence, Local Monotonicity and Expansion.
We have presented a semantic framework that generalizes Tarski's. It involves a choice function on sets of models. This choice function is assumed to satisfy three conditions. We argued that those three conditions are natural, but the ultimate test of their interest lies ahead. The Social Choice literature mentions two main results about choice functions that satisfy Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity. In [28] , it is shown that they are exactly the choice functions that satisfy Contraction and
In [2] , it is shown that, if M is nite, they are exactly the pseudo-rationalizable choice functions, i.e., those that may be de ned by a nite set of binary preference relations > i on M by taking, for f (X), the set of all elements of X that are minimal in X for at least one of the > i 's. None of these results will be used in this paper.
Qualitative Measures
A completely di erent generalization of Tarski's semantic analysis will be reviewed now. Its origins may be traced to Dubois and Prade [8] and Ben-David and Ben-Eliyahu [4] . Up to small technical changes, our presentation will be that of Friedman and Halpern [14, 15] . The connection between both approaches is described in [33] . Some more results concerning the link between plausibility measures and preferential relations may be found in [10] .
Suppose we had some way of measuring the size or the importance of sets of models. One is tempted to say that a formula a may be deduced from a set A of formulas i the measure of the set of all models of A that satisfy a is larger than that of the set of models of A that do not satisfy a. Since, as in the case of monotonic logic, one would like to deduce anything from an inconsistent set of formulas, the case that the set of models of A is negligible, i.e., not larger than the empty set, has to be treated separately. With the notations of Section 5.2, one would like to assume a binary relation > on 2 M (X > Y i the measure of X is larger than that of Y ) and de ne the deductive operation by:
This de nition indeed generalizes Tarski's. For Tarski: X > Y i Y = ; and X 6 = ;.
The following list of natural properties for > is similar to Friedman and Halpern's de nition of a Qualitative Plausibility Measure. 1 The properties described here are in fact stronger than theirs: the representation result holds for both sets of properties. First, it seems reasonable to require that > be a strict partial order relation, i.e., irre exive and transitive. This seems implied by our description of X > Y as meaning that the measure of X is larger than that of Y . Note that we do not require the relation > to be total, which would not be reasonable since X and Y may have equal measure without being equal, nor even to be modular, i.e., satisfy the property X > Y implies that, for any Z, either X > Z or Z > Y . Modularity will be assumed in Section 10.
The relation > is irre exive and transitive: (3) 1 Friedman and Halpern assume a function P l : 2 M 7 ! D and a re exive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation on D satisfying:
A second very natural property of > is that it should behave as expected with respect to set inclusion. The reader will easily be convinced that, in our setting, the correct formulation is the following:
Our third property deals with the special character of the empty set. The empty set is the ultimate small set and any set X that is not strictly greater than the empty set must be extremely small and negligible. In many cases, any nonempty set will be strictly greater than the empty set, but we do not wish to make this a requirement. Since the union of any family of empty sets is empty, it is reasonable to require that the union of a family of negligible sets be negligible.
This is the in nitary version of property (A3) of Friedman and Halpern. The nitary version is not enough for Theorem 3 to hold. The next two properties have to deal with the qualitative character of the relation >. Qualitatively greater has to be understood here as an order of magnitude greater. Assume
Note that the de nition of C in 2 makes use of the relation > only between sets with an empty intersection. Property 6 can therefore only have an indirect in uence. The qualitative plausibility measures of Friedman and Halpern need not satisfy Property 6. The results presented in Section 5.4 show that one may add this property without harm. Friedman and Halpern consider a property (A2) that implies the nitary version of 7. The nitary version of 7 together with 6 imply (A2). The next and last property is the fundamental one that makes the qualitative character of > apparent.
A set that is greater than every one of a family of sets must be greater than their union: pooling small sets never makes a big set. This seems to be the essence of qualitative.
We have presented a set of properties for > and have argued that they are natural properties for a qualitative measure. No such argument can be completely convincing. In the next section, it will be shown that the properties 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 for > are equivalent to the conditions of Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity for f . This equivalence suggests that those two sets of properties and the nonmonotonic operations they de ne have a central role to play in the study of nonmonotonic logics. To the best of my knowledge, the qualitative measures have not been studied by the Social Choice community. Since, as will be seen in Section 5.4, they are equivalent to choice functions, it may be worthwhile to ask whether they can help there. The property of Expansion considered in Social Choice translates readily into S i2I X i > Z implies that there is some i 2 I such that X i > Z.
A Semantic Equivalence
Theorem 2 Suppose f is a choice function that satis es Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity. Then, the relation > de ned by: Before we get to the proof, let us ponder on the translation proposed. Is it a natural translation, i.e., does it t the intuitive interpretations given to > and f ? The sets X such that f (X) = ; are the no solution sets (in our running examples: no suitable apartments in X). They may be assumed to be small. If X is qualitatively larger than Y , it is reasonable to assume that X is not so small as to have an empty image under f . In Section 5.3, the intuition we developed was that X is qualitatively larger than Y means that X contains some important elements Y does not contain. The important elements are those of f (X) and Y contains none of them. Proof : Let us show, rst, that C satis es
The only thing left for us to check is that if
, which follows from Coherence. Irre exivity of > follows from Contraction. For Transitivity, assume
. We have f (X) Y X and, by Local Monotonicity, f (Y ) f (X) and f (X) 6 = ;. We have shown that f (X) 6 = ;
. We have
For property 5, we notice that, from the de nition of >, X > ; i f (X) 6 = ;. We have to show that f (X i ) = ; for any i 2 I implies f ( . The only thing left for us to prove is that we have f (X) 6 = ;. Notice that, by Coher-
by assumption.
Before we prove the last property needed, 7, let us prove a lemma.
Before we get to the second leg of our equivalence trip, let us notice an additional property.
De nition 2 If x 2 X we shall say that x is heavy in X i X 6 > fxg. The proof is obvious.
The second half of the equivalence between choice functions and qualitative measures will be described now. Proof : By de nition, f satis es Contraction. For Coherence, assume X Y and x 2 X is heavy in Y , i.e., Y 6 > fxg. By property 4, X 6 > fxg and x is heavy in X. We have proved that f satis es Coherence.
For Local Monotonicity, assume Y X and all heavy elements of X are in Y . Let y be a heavy element of Y . We know that y 2 X. We must show that y is heavy in X. Since all heavy elements in X are in Y , any member z of X Y is not heavy in X and therefore X > fzg. By property 7, we have X > X Y . If y was not heavy in X, again by 7, we would have X > (X Y ) [ fyg. By property 6, then, Y fyg > X Y [ fyg. By property 4, then, we would have Y > fyg, contrary to the assumption that y is heavy in Y . We have shown that f satis es Local Monotonicity.
We must now show that C satis es Equation 1. Our proof will be exactly the same as the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 2, once we have shown that the property used as a de nition in Theorem 2 holds true.
Assume X > Y . By property 4, X > ;. By property 5, there is some element of x 2 X such that fxg > ;. The element x is heavy in fxg since > is irre exive, and therefore x 2 f (fxg). By Coherence, we conclude that f (X) 6 = ;. By property 4, if y 2 Y , then X > fyg and y is not heavy in X. We have shown that Y \ f (X) = ;
.
Suppose now that f (X)
We have shown that the two very di erent semantic frameworks proposed by choice functions and qualitative measures are equivalent. This is a clear indication that the notion captured is important and that the operations C that may be de ned in those frameworks form a class of great interest. Section 4 proposes a characterization of those operations. The representation result is proved in Section 7.
Choice functions: a general semantics for nonmonotonic operations
It is now time to get rid of the simplifying assumption that all sets of models are de nable (see De nition 1), made in Section 5.2. In the general case, when certain sets of models are not de nable, we must take a second look at the properties of choice functions considered in Section 5.2. Notice, rst, that in the de nition of C(A) as f ( b A), the argument of f is a de nable set ( b A). We have no need for applying f to a set that is not de nable and, therefore, we shall assume that the domain of f is the set of de nable sets of models. First, we shall require that the image under f of a de nable set be de nable. This requirement has been introduced by Schlechta in [31] . Then, we shall understand the variables X and Y appearing in the de nition of the properties of f that we considered (Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity), not as ranging over all sets of models X and Y , but only over de nable such sets.
On the rst point, we expect to be able to describe (by a set of formulas) the sets in which we are interested, and on which we want to apply the choice function f . But, similarly, we expect the result of the application of f , the set of preferred elements of a set X to be de nable by a set of formulas (otherwise, how could we describe it in the language at our disposal?). We shall consider choice functions that are de ned only on de nable sets of models and that send de nable sets to de nable sets, i.e., we assume:
The identity function obviously preserves de nability. This property has never been considered by the Social Choice community, which seems to have been interested so far only in the case that M is nite. On the second point, for example, Local Monotonicity is now understood as: for any de nable sets X, Y , such that f (X) Y X, one has f (Y ) f (X). It turns out (the proof is left to the reader) that one may extend any f de ned on de nable sets (and satisfying Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity) to arbitrary subsets by: f (X) = X \ f ( c X). This extension satis es Contraction and Coherence for any subsets X, Y , but it does not satisfy Local Monotonicity for arbitrary such sets. It satis es the following: for any sets X, Y such that f ( c X) Y X, one has f (Y ) f (X). In the next section, the family of nonmonotonic operations de ned by Equation 1 from de nability-preserving choice functions that satisfy Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity will be described.
Representation result
We shall now state and then prove our main characterization result. It proves an exact correspondence between the choice function semantics of Section 6 and the properties of C described in Section 4. Theorems 2 and 3 show that those properties also correspond exactly with the qualitative measures of Section 5.3, at least under the simplifying assumption of Section 5.1. Lifting this simplifying assumption there would involve a careful study of which sets of models are measurable in the qualitative sense. This can surely be done.
Theorem 4 Suppose we are given a language L and a function C : 2 L ! 2 L . Then, the following two conditions are equivalent: For Inclusion, notice that, by Contraction,
A and we conclude that A C(A). We shall now prove a lemma that makes use of the de nability preservation property.
For Idempotence, notice that, by Inclusion (already proved), we have A C(A) and therefore
). We conclude that we have C(C(A)) C(A). The opposite inclusion follows from Inclusion.
For Cautious Monotonicity, we use Local Monotonicity and Lemma 4.
We conclude that C(A) C(B).
The next remark will be useful.
A. We shall prove Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity. Since
By Lemma 5, then, C(A; B) C(C(A); B; C). Conditional Monotonicity is obtained by taking C = ;. For Threshold Monotonicity, take A = C(D) and use Idempotence.
We have proved the soundness part. Let us proceed to the proof of completeness: property 1 implies property 2. Assume that C satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity. We shall now describe M and the satisfaction relation j= in a unsurprising way. We shall take M to be set of all sets T of formulas such that T = C(T ). Such a set T will be called a theory. We shall de ne j= by: T j= a i a 2 T .
Let us draw some consequences from the de nition of j=.
Lemma 6 For any A L, b
A is the set of all theories that include A and 
Proof : By de nition, b
A is the set of all theories that include A and b A is the intersection of all theories that include A. Let T be any theory that includes A: A T = C(T ) = C(A; T ) and therefore T = C(A; B) for some B. We have shown that A, it is a consequence operation, i.e., satis es Inclusion, Idempotence and Monotonicity. This remark is very close to a result of J. Dietrich in [6] . Notice that, by Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity we have: Proof : By Lemma 7, we have C(A) Cn(C(A)) C(C(A)). By Idempotence, we have C(A) = Cn(C(A)) = C(C(A)). We may now de ne the choice function f . Consider an arbitrary de nable set
and therefore we may de ne f (X) by:
One immediately sees that the choice function f preserves de nability, since d C(A) is de nable. We must now show that f satis es Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity, and that
Let us deal with this last question rst. By (11) 
We have shown that Equation 12 holds.
It is clear from Equation 11 that f satis es Contraction. Let us prove now that f satis es Coherence. Assume X Y . We have Y X and therefore C(X) = C(Y ; X). By Equation 10, we have C(X) Cn(C(Y ); X). Therefore,
We conclude that X \ f (Y ) X \ d C(X) = f (X). Finally, let us show that f satis es Local Monotonicity. Assume f ( c X) Y X. We have, by Equation 12 , X Y f ( c X) = C(X). By Cautious Monotonicity, then, we conclude that
The proof of Theorem 4 is now complete.
One may check that, if the operation C is monotonic, then, the operation f de ned in the construction above is the identity on de nable sets:
, the set of all theories that include C(A), which is equal to b A, the set of all theories that include A.
Properties of nonmonotonic operations

First Properties
We shall consider some properties of the operations that satisfy Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity, nonmonotonic operations in the sequel.
For such operations, the intersection of two theories is not always a theory. Consider, for example, the language that contains two elements a and b and the operation de ned by: C(A) = A for any A 6 = ; and C(;) = fag. This is not a monotonic operation: the only breach of monotonicity is C(;) 6 C(b). It is easy to check that it satis es our conditions. But C(a) \ C(b) = ; is not a theory.
In the monotonic framework, the operation C is de ned by the set of its theories, C(A) being the intersection of all theories including A. In the nonmonotonic framework, this is not the case. Two di erent operations may de ne the same set of theories. The example above will prove our case. The operation C 0 de ned by C 0 (;) = fbg and otherwise C 0 (X) = C(X) is di erent from C but it has exactly the same theories as C.
The property concerning the intersection of a family of operations holds, but its proof is more intricate that in the monotonic case. If C i is a family of nonmonotonic operations (i.e., satisfying Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity), its intersection is a nonmonotonic operation. The easiest proof may be semantic: each C i is de ned by a set M i and a choice function f i . Consider the set S i M i (assume the M i have pairwise empty intersections) and the function f that operates as f i on M i and takes the union of the sets obtained this way. It is easy to see it satis es Inclusion, Coherence and Local Monotonicity. The operation de ned this way is the intersection of the C i 's.
It is easy to see that, if C is nonmonotonic, i.e., satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity, then, so is C 0 de ned by: C 0 (A) = C(A; B).
Connectives
We shall now nd elegant properties of (nonmonotonic) C that characterize the (semantically) classical propositional connectives. We shall see that the nonmonotonic logic of the (semantically) classical connectives is classical propositional logic. We do not consider, in this work, the many possibilities o ered by nonmonotonic logics for the de nition of non-classical connectives, i.e., connectives that are not de ned by truth tables. As in the case of monotonic logic, some additional compactness property is needed for the completeness result. The property required is weak and does not amount at all to requiring the operation C to be compact.
A word of caution about terminology is needed here. In sequent calculus presentations, connectives are characterized by left and right rules. In natural deduction presentations, they are characterized by introduction and elimination rules. We mix those two terminologies freely to name the rules we are interested in.
Let us consider, rst, the case of conjunction. Assume that L is closed under a binary^and that we consider only satisfaction relations that satisfy:
x j= a^b i x j= a and x j= b: (13) Then C, de ned by C(A) = f ( b A) satis es:
The proof is very easy: the models that satisfy A and a^b are exactly those that satisfy A, a and b. Notice that the treatment of conjunction is exactly the same as in the monotonic case.
Let us, now, consider the case of negation. Assume L is closed under a unary : and that we consider only satisfaction relations that satisfy:
x j= :a i x 6 j= a: (15) The left introduction rule of the monotonic case: a 2 C(A) implies C(A; :a) = L is not valid in our nonmonotonic framework. The rules we propose to characterize negation are the following. . Therefore f ( b A) Mod(fag) and a 2 C(A). One may notice that a similar result fails in Relevance Logic [29] , where the Boolean negation of [26] , de ned by (15) , is not reasonable.
Consider, now, the case of disjunction. Assume L is closed under a binary _ and that we consider only satisfaction relations that satisfy:
x j= a _ b i either x j= a or x j= b: (18) The Or introduction rule of monotonic sequent calculus, a left introduction rule, is valid:
This follows easily from the fact that a model that satis es a _ b satis es at least one of a or b and from Coherence:
The right elimination rule of the monotonic case:
is not valid. We replace it by a right introduction rule.
Its validity is obvious.
Lastly, consider the case of material implication. Assume L is closed under a binary ! and that we consider only satisfaction relations that satisfy:
x 6 j= a ! b i x j= a and x 6 j= b:
The right introduction rule of the monotonic case is valid:
Assume b 2 C(A; a). Let B be set of all models in f ( b A) that satisfy a. By Coherence, B f (Mod(A [ fag) ) and therefore all models in B satisfy b and also a ! b. All models in f ( b A) B satisfy a ! b. We conclude that all models in f ( b A) satisfy a ! b and a ! b 2 C(A). The right elimination rule of the monotonic case: a ! b 2 C(A) implies b 2 C(A; a) is not valid. We shall use the following left introduction rule:
which is easily seen to be valid.
Suppose L is closed under some subset of the connectives^, :, _ and !. Is it the case that any operation C that satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity, Threshold Monotonicity and the two properties corresponding to each one of the connectives concerned may be de ned by a set of models, a satisfaction relation that satis es the requirement concerning each of the connectives considered and a choice function that satis es Inclusion, Coherence and Local Monotonicity?
The answer cannot be positive in general. Although the answer is positive for a language L that contains conjunction as its sole connective, it is negative as soon as L contains a negation. A compactness assumption will ensure a positive answer. Without any such assumption, already in the monotonic framework, the result does not hold. Consider the following example. The language L has an in nite set of atomic propositions and is closed under negation. The monotonic operation C satis es a 2 C(A) i C(A; :a) = L, and therefore we may always remove double negations and is de ned (up to removal of double negations) by: C(A) = A if A is nite and does not contain an atomic proposition and its negation, and C(A) = L otherwise (i.e., if A is in nite or contains an atomic proposition and its negation). Notice that this C fails the Lindenbaum lemma: there are consistent sets but no maximal consistent set. Assume C is representable by a suitable f . Let Y = f ( b ;) and y 2 Y . We have fyg = b y, and, by Coherence, y 2 f (fyg). Also, f (fyg) = d C(y). But y includes a in nite number of atomic propositions or an in nite number of negations of atomic propositions, therefore C(y) = L and f (fyg) = ;. A contradiction to y 2 f (fyg). We conclude that Y = ;. But then C(;) = L, a contradiction.
We shall, then, assume that C satis es the following:
Notice that the Weak Compactness assumed does not imply, in the nonmonotonic framework, that, if a 2 C(A), then there is a nite subset B of A such that a 2 C(B), even when proper connectives are available. In the monotonic case, the monotonic left introduction rule for negation makes Compactness follow from Weak Compactness, but we rejected this rule. Before we state and prove the main theorem of this section, let us build the tools for the proof. We shall assume that C satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity, Threshold Monotonicity and Weak Compactness. We assume that L is closed under some set of connectives that includes negation and that C satis es the two properties described above for each of the connectives assumed to be in the language (in particular it satis es 16 and 17) . Recall that A is a theory i A = C(A).
De nition 3
A set A L is said to be inconsistent i C(A) = L. A set that is not inconsistent is said to be consistent.
Notice that, by Idempotence, A is consistent i C(A) is consistent, and that there is only one inconsistent theory, namely L.
Lemma 10 If A B and A is inconsistent, then B is inconsistent.
Proof :
We have: A B L = C(A). By Cautious Monotonicity, then,
The following notion is fundamental.
De nition 4 A set
A is said to be maximal consistent i it is consistent and any strict superset B A is inconsistent.
The next two lemmas are central.
Lemma 11
If A is consistent, there is some maximal consistent set B such that A B.
Proof : The proof is as in the classical case. It is included only for completeness sake. Consider any ascending chain of consistent sets, A i , i 2 I, where i < j implies A i A j . We claim that the union B = S i2I A i is consistent. If it were inconsistent, by Weak Compactness, there would be some nite inconsistent subset of B. This subset would be a subset of A i for some i, and by Lemma 10, A i would be inconsistent, contrary to assumption. We have shown that the union of any ascending chain of consistent sets is consistent. Zorn's lemma, then, implies that any consistent A may be embedded in a maximal consistent set.
Lemma 12
If A is maximal consistent, then 1. A is a theory, 2. (if^is in the language) a^b 2 A i a 2 A and b 2 A, 3. :a 2 A i a 6 2 A,
Proof : Assume A is maximal consistent. If C(A) were a strict superset of A it would be inconsistent, but then A would be inconsistent. Therefore
By 14, and since A is a theory, a^b 2 A i a 2 A and b 2 A. The maximality of A is not used here.
Assume :a 2 A. If we had a 2 A, we would, by 16 have C(A) = L, a contradiction to the consistency of A. Assume, now, :a 6 2 A. Since A is maximal consistent, C(A; :a) = L. By 17, we have a 2 C(A) = A.
Assume a 2 A or b 2 A. By the right introduction rule 20, a _ b 2 C(A) = A. Assume, now that a _ b 2 A. We must show that at least one of a or b is in A. Suppose, a contrario, that neither one is in A. Since A is maximal consis- The next theorem shows that the Introduction Elimination rules above de ne exactly the (semantically) classical connectives.
Theorem 5 Assume that L is closed under some of the propositional connectives, including negation, and that C satis es the Introduction and Elimination properties described above for each of the connectives of the language. Let C satisfy Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity, Threshold Monotonicity and Weak Compactness. Then, there is a set M, a satisfaction relation j= that behaves classically for each of the existing connectives and a de nability-preserving choice function f that satis es Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity that de nes C, i.e., such that C(A) = f ( b A), for any A L.
Proof : The proof proceeds exactly as the proof of the completeness part of Theorem 4, except that, for the set M we take, not all theories, but only the maximal consistent sets of formulas. The proof proceeds exactly in the same way, as soon as we have proved Lemma 13 to replace Lemma 6. The fact that the satisfaction relation behaves classically for the connectives follows from Lemma 12.
Lemma 13 For any A L, b
A is the set of all maximal consistent sets that include A and b A = T B L C(A; B).
Proof : By de nition, b
A is the set of all maximal consistent sets that include A and b
A is the intersection of all maximal consistent sets that include A. Let T be such a set. By Lemma 12, T is a theory and: A T = C(T ) = C(A; T ) and therefore T = C(A; B) for some B. We have shown that
But, suppose, now, that a 6 2 C(A; B). By 17, C(A; B; :a) 6 = L (we need here the assumption that negation is in the language). By Lemma 11, C(A; B; :a) is a subset of some maximal consistent set. This set, since it is consistent and contains :a, does not contain a (see 16) . Therefore a 6 2 b
A. We have shown that b A T B L C(A; B) and our claim is proved. One may ask whether the result holds even for languages that do not include negation. The question is open. But, notice that, in the proof, we make use of the fact that, if T is a theory and a 6 2 T , then there is a maximal consistent superset of T that does not include a. This does not hold in general: for example, if C is the operation of deduction of intuitionistic logic and p is an atomic proposition, p 6 2 C(::p), but any maximal consistent set that includes ::p must include p.
We may now show that propositional nonmonotonic logic is not weaker than (and therefore exactly the same as) monotonic logic. = L. Theorem 6 shows that the proof theory of the semantically-classical propositional connectives in a nonmonotonic setting is the same as in a monotonic setting. The nonmonotonic setting is very rich, and it is tempting to consider, there, connectives the semantics of which is not locally truth-functional: the truth-value of 2a or of a b in a model m depending on the choice function f . This is left for future work.
It is customary to consider Introduction-Elimination rules as de nitions of the connectives. Hacking [17, Section VII] discusses this idea and proposes that, to be considered as bona de de nitions of the connectives, the rules must be such that they ensure that any legal logic on a small language may be conservatively extended to a legal logic on the language extended by closure under the connective. We may ask whether any nonmonotonic operation C on L that satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity may be conservatively extended to such an operation that satis es the Introduction-Elimination rules above: (14) , (16) , (17) , (19) , (20) , (22) and 23). From the discussion above, just before the de nition of Weak Compactness, it seems that Weak Compactness will be required. The question of whether Weak Compactness is su cient to ensure a conservative extension is open. The result will be proven under a stronger assumption: the set of atomic propositions is nite (this essentially the Simplifying Assumption of Section 5.1).
Theorem 7 Let L be the propositional calculus on a nite set P of atomic propositions. Let C be an operation on P that satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity. Then, there exists an operation C' on L that satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity, Threshold Monotonicity and the rules: (14) , (16) , (17), (19) , (20) , (22) and (23), such that, for any A P , C(A) = P \ C 0 (A).
Proof : Since P is nite, C is trivially weakly compact, the assumptions of Theorem 5 hold and C is therefore generated by some M, j= and f . All subsets of M are de nable and f is therefore de ned on all subsets of M . We may extend j= to the language L by using equations (13) , (15) , (18) and ( 21) . The choice function f , then de nes an operation C' on L by (1) . Since f satis es Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity, the operation C' satis es Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity and Threshold Monotonicity. Since the models of M satisfy equations (13), (15) , (18) and ( 21), C satis es the Introduction-Elimination rules. It is left to us to see that C(A) = P \ C 0 (A), for any A P . This follows straightforwardly from the fact that both C(A) and C 0 (A) are the set of formulas (the former of P , the latter of L) satis ed by all models of the set f ( b A).
Comparison with previous work
Let us assume that L is a propositional language, and that C satis es Weak Compactness, Inclusion, Idempotence, Cautious Monotonicity, Conditional Monotonicity, Threshold Monotonicity and the Introduction-Elimination rules for all the propositional connectives. One may de ne a consequence operation on L by: a b i b 2 C(fag).
Theorem 8 Under the assumptions above, the relation is preferential (see [19] ).
Proof : The result follows easily from Theorem 5. We shall treat only two of the six properties, the reader will easily treat the other four properties. Consider Left Logical Equivalence. Assume that a is logically equivalent to a 0 . Then d fag = d fa 0 g and C(fag) = C(fa 0 g). Consider Or. Assume c 2 C(fag) and c 2 C(fbg). Any 
satis es c and c 2 C(a _ b). Does the converse hold, i.e., may any preferential relation be obtained from such an operation C in such a way? The answer is yes.
Theorem 9
Let be any preferential relation. There is an operation C satisfying all the assumptions above such that a b i b 2 C(fag).
Proof : This follows from the construction of Theorem 14 of [13] . The theorem claims that any nitary preferential operation (i.e., preferential relation) may be conservatively extended to an in nitary preferential operation C. The de nition of C is the following: b 2 C(A) i there exists some formula a such that A j= a (j= is logical implication of propositional calculus) enjoying the following property: for any a 0 such that A j= a 0 and a 0 j= a, one has a 0 b.
The reader may check, with no need to use the theorem of [13] and relatively easily, that C satis es all the properties requested. For example, C is weakly compact. Assume C(A) = L. Then false 2 C(A) and there is some a such that A j= a and a false. But there is a nite subset B of A such that B j= a and B false. Therefore false 2 C(B).
Rational Monotonicity
In this section, an important sub-family of nonmonotonic operations will be described. It corresponds, in the present setting, to the rational relations of [22] . The qualitative measures of Section 5.3 were partial orders. Measures (probability measures, for example) provide orders that obey an additional modularity property:
This seems a very natural property to require of a qualitative measure. Assume for example that there is a function m : 2 M ! R, the set of real numbers such that X > Y i m(X) > m(Y ), then, > is modular.
What is the property of choice functions that correspond to the modularity of a qualitative measure?
This property is in fact only one half of the property studied by K. Arrow in [3] , assuming Contraction. The other half is Coherence. Note indeed that Arrow, Coherence and Contraction imply
the property originally considered by K. Arrow. Indeed, by Coherence X \ f (Y ) f (X); by Arrow, f (X) f (Y ); by contraction f (X) X.
The intuitive justi cation for Arrow is some kind of laziness principle for the choice function: if X Y and we have already a list of the best elements of Y , we shall take for the best elements of X exactly those best elements of Y that happen to be in X, at least whenever this new list is not empty. A remark will now show that there is a natural family of choice functions that satisfy Arrow. Suppose the elements of M are ranked: our real estate agent, for example, gives a grade to every available apartment and, when asked about apartments in some area, delivers the list of all available apartments in this area that have the highest ranking. If the highest ranking in Paris is 10 and one of those apartments graded 10 happens to be on the left bank, then all best apartments on the left bank have grade 10 and are therefore part of the list of best apartments in Paris. We shall now show that Modularity and Arrow are indeed exact counterparts.
Theorem 10 If > satis es properties 4 and 24, then, the choice function f de ned by taking for f (X) the set of heavy elements (see De nition 2) of X satis es Arrow. If f is a choice function that satis es Contraction, Coherence, Local Monotonicity and Arrow, then, the relation > de ned by:
Proof : Assume > satis es properties 4 and 24, and that X Y and x 2 X such that Y 6 > fxg. Let x 0 be any heavy element of X: X 6 > fx 0 g. If x 0 was not heavy in Y , we would have Y > fx 0 g and, by 24, Y > X and, by 4, Y > fxg, a contradiction. Therefore any heavy element of X is a heavy element of Y .
Assume now that f satis es Contraction, Coherence, Local Monotonicity and Arrow and that X > Y . We shall show that either X > Z or Z > Y . We . By Arrow, f (Mod(A [ B) ) f ( b A). Therefore C(A) C (A; B) .
For the completeness part, we de ne Cn as in the proof of Theorem 4. The properties of Cn proved there hold true. We must de ne M slightly more carefully. We take for elements of M only those sets T 6 = L such that T = Cn(T ). The satisfaction relation is de ned as previously: T j= a i a 2 T . We see that, by construction, no element of M satis es all formulas of L and therefore X = L implies X = ;. We de ne f as previously. The proof that Equation 12 holds is unchanged. Assuming Rational Monotonicity, we must show that Arrow holds. Assume X Y and X \ f (Y ) 6 = ;. . By the remark made at the start of this proof, when paying attention to exclude L from the set M, we see that Mod(A [ C(B)) 6 = L. Therefore C(A; C(B)) 6 = L. It is easy to show that C(A; C(B)) = C(Cn(A); C(Cn(B))). We may therefore use Rational Monotonicity to conclude that we have C(B) C(A), i.e., C(Y ) C(X) and d C(X) d C(Y ). Therefore X \ d C(X) Y \ d C(Y ), i.e., f (X) f (Y ). We have shown that the additional property of Rational Monotonicity, studied in the literature, corresponds exactly to an additional property of the choice function f . The family of nonmonotonic operations satisfying Rational Monotonicity has di erent closure properties than the larger family studied in the preceding sections. In particular, it is not closed under intersection. The reader will easily nd a counter example. One such example is provided in [25] .
Conclusion
We have described two quite di erent but equivalent semantic frameworks: choice functions and qualitative measures, that provide an ontology for nonmonotonic deduction. Choice functions have been studied by researchers in Social Choice for their rationalizability properties, i.e., by what kind of aggregation mechanism can they arise from individual preferences? The equivalence we have shown with qualitative measures may be of interest to those researchers. The family of nonmonotonic operations de ned in Section 4 is precisely the family de ned by choice functions or by qualitative measures, it is a natural generalization of Tarski's monotonic deductive operations. The operations of this family are closed under intersection. The classical connectives may be de ned elegantly for this family of operations, by properties that are weaker than those generally considered in the monotonic case. Only a very mild compactness assumption is needed. The sentential connectives may be de ned by Introduction-Elimination rules. The connectives de ned have a classical semantics. A further property of choice functions, considered by K. Arrow [3] , is shown to be equivalent to the modularity (i.e., negative-transitivity) of the qualitative measure and the operations dened are characterized by the additional property of Rational Monotonicity of [19, 22] .
A large number of questions and alleys for future research are left open by this work. Let us mention a few, roughly from the small and technical to the vast and philosophical.
The equivalence of Qualitative Measures and Choice functions semantics has been shown only under the Simplifying Assumption. A more general equivalence requires the introduction of a family of de nable sets in the framework of Qualitative Measures and probably the introduction of some counterpart to De nability Preservation. Theorem 7 has been proved only under the assumption that P is nite. Does it hold without this restriction, and if not, does it hold without this restriction if one assumes C to be weakly compact?
The framework of Choice Functions begs the semantic de nition of nonclassical, non-truth functional connectives. The study of such connectives (unary or, more probably, binary) in nonmonotonic logics seems particularly exciting. The preferred interpretation of the choice function suggests a link with deontic logics.
This work sheds new light on properties studied by researchers in Social Choice. In particular new insights on the case of an in nite set of outcomes have been presented. Are they relevant to the Social Choice community?
In [22] , a positive answer was given to a question that can now be seen as equivalent to: given a choice function that satis es Contraction, Coherence and Local Monotonicity, is there a canonical way to restrict this choice function in a way that ensures the Arrow property? This canonical construction, rational closure, o ers a way to aggregate individual preferences into collective preferences that satisfy the Arrow property. This aggregation method does not satisfy Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives. Is it of any interest for Social Choice?
This work uses Tarski's framework. Most proof-theoretic studies use Gentzen's framework. The translation of the results of this paper to the language of Gentzen's sequents may be illuminating. It seems one will have to consider sequents whose sides may be in nite sets of formulas.
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